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
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<p>Indonesia is a land of wide diversity in terms of geology, ecology, mineral resources, and ethnic diversity. A very critical aspect of Indonesian diversity is the "perennial problem" of the ethnic Chinese minority as it relates to the predominantly Malay majority groups, and as it affects both the domestic security and foreign relations of Indonesia. The cleavage that exists between "native" Indonesians and the ethnic Chinese is the most explosive source of communal conflict. Although the ethnic Chinese are very much a minority group they exercise a critical influence on key sectors of the Indonesian economy and government policy.</p>					
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NAME OF CANDIDATE: Joseph B. BURROUGHS, Jr., Captain, USMC

PAPER APPROVED:

Richard G. Stevens

RICHARD G. STEVENS, PhD
Associate Dean

Barbara J. Kuennecke

BARBARA J. KUENNECKE, CAPT, USAF
Assistant Dean for Graduate Programs

APPROVED BY	
DATE	
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**THE PERENNIAL PROBLEM:
THE CHINESE MINORITY IN INDONESIA**

by

**J. B. BURROUGHS, Jr.
Captain, USMC**


**Special Seminar Paper submitted to the Faculty of the
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SUMMARY

Indonesia is a land of wide diversity in terms of geology, ecology, mineral resources, and ethnic diversity. This paper will describe a very critical aspect of Indonesian diversity: the "perennial problem" of the ethnic Chinese minority as it relates to the predominantly Malay majority groups, and as it affects both the domestic security and and foreign relations of Indonesia.

The paper considers the composition of the Chinese communities living in Indonesia; the patterns of Chinese migrations to the area over the last three centuries; the crucial impact of the events surrounding the "30 September Movement," and how those events have shaped both domestic and foreign policies pursued by Suharto's "New Order" government.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA



Source of the map:
 F. W. Speed, Indonesia Today,
 London: Angus & Robertson,
 1971, pp. iii-iv.



THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL EMBLEM

Translation of the Motto:

"Unity in Diversity"

INTRODUCTION

The motto of the Republic of Indonesia is "Unity in Diversity," a concept which is more of a dream than a reality. The Indonesian archipelago is the largest in the world, a sprawling network of more than 13,000 islands and islets. Only about 6,000 have names and less than 1,000 are occupied. The islands range in size from the nameless, uninhabited reefs to Kalimantan (Borneo), which is the size of Texas. The country stretches across a great arc in the vicinity of the equator, extending some 3,000 miles from east to west and 1,000 miles from north to south.

In terms of raw materials, Indonesia is one of the five or six richest countries in the world. It is the world's 12th largest oil producer, the third largest among non-Arab states. In addition to oil, Indonesia is a warehouse of nickle, tin, bauxite, copper, and other ores. The islands are also major exporters of lumber, rubber, palm oil, sisal, tea, coffee, tobacco, and spices.(1) Despite these impressive economic assets, the majority of Indonesians are poverty-stricken, the country's economic infrastructure is inadequate, public health almost non-existent, and communications poor.

(1) Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesia: The Critical Years 1976-78, (London: The Insitute for the Study of Conflict, 1974), p. 1.

As Bunge points out,(2) its geographic location at one of the world's major crossroads has made Indonesia important in the context of regional and super power rivalries. The country forms a natural barrier separating the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. With Malaysia, it commands the Strait of Malacca -- one of the world's busiest waterways. Through its islands also pass other important sea routes from the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf to China, Japan, and North and South America. Travel between Australia and East Asia, as well as from South and Southeast Asia to North America, must also traverse the archipelago.

Indonesia's boundaries were determined arbitrarily by the boundaries of Dutch colonial jurisdiction before the Indonesians won their independence. In two cases, islands are actually shared with other nations: Borneo with Malaysia and Brunei; and New Guinea with Papua New Guinea. Indonesia is the fifth largest country in the world in terms of population (estimated at almost 160,000,000 in mid-1984) after China, the Soviet Union, India, and the United States. The main island of Java is the most densely populated large piece of real estate in the world: over 90,000,000 people on an island measuring approximately 150 by 600 miles.

(2) Frederika M. Bunge, et al., Indonesia: A Country Study, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 67.

By the standards of international law and diplomacy, the Republic of Indonesia is indeed a state. But like so many other new countries, Indonesia has had some serious problems in becoming a nation. For example, it is almost impossible to speak of an "Indonesian people." There are more than 300 ethnic groups, each with its own cultural identity, and over 250 distinct languages and dialects. Each group has its own customs, system of values, religious beliefs, and different ways of adapting to the various ecological environments.

Generally, Indonesians are classified as Malays and belong to the Malay triangle which stretches between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The official language, Indonesian, is basically Malay. The peoples themselves range from sophisticated city-dwellers to semi-nomadic jungle tribesmen scarcely removed from the stone age. Some Indonesians operate complex computer systems, while others are barely able to cope with the wheel. Many Indonesians are fanatical Muslims, desiring an Islamic state similar to that being attempted by the followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Most Indonesians, however, are only nominally Moslem. They still worship their ancestors and practice a primitive form of animism, believing that all objects possess spirits that must be worshipped or placated. There are also strong Christian and Hindu minorities, still

stubbornly attempting to maintain their own separate identities.

A little more than half of the Indonesian population is ethnically Javanese, living mostly in the islands of Java, Madura, and part of Sumatra. Javanese dominance, particularly in cultural, political, economic, and military affairs has created conflicts and resentments with other ethnic groups. Unity in modern Indonesia has meant unity in a Javanese context.

Ethnic awareness is more prevalent where interethnic contact is most frequent, such as in urban centers and the coastal areas. To outsiders, the people will identify themselves first as Indonesians and second as members of a particular ethnic group. But among themselves, ethnic identity is the main basis for maintaining solidarity and interpersonal relationships. As Polomka has pointed out,(3) in encounters between Indonesians, ethnic identities dictate the conventions, etiquette, and manner of speech to be used. Almost every ethnic group has its own system of social stratification and religious and economic orientation.

However, the most explosive source of communal conflict has been the "perennial problem" of Indonesia: the cleavage that exists between "native" Indonesians and the ethnic Chi-

(3) Peter Polomka, Indonesia Since Sukarno, (Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 83.

nese. With only about three percent (five million) of a total Indonesian population of 160 million, the ethnic Chinese are very much a minority group. However, they exercise a critical influence on key sectors of the Indonesian economy which far outweighs their actual numbers.

A MONOLITHIC MINORITY?

One of the most troublesome aspects of dealing with the Chinese minority in Indonesia is one of identification. Although most Indonesians of non-Chinese ancestry perceive the Chinese minority to be "monolithic," the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are actually quite heterogeneous. The racial, linguistic, and religious categories normally used to identify the members of a group are largely irrelevant, because a large number of Indonesian Chinese have mixed racial backgrounds, do not speak the Chinese language, observe non-Chinese religions, and have "Indonesianized" their names. There are many persons in Java who are uniformly considered Chinese, but are less than one-quarter Chinese by ancestry. Other persons who are more than one-quarter Chinese by ancestry consider themselves to be indigenous or native Indonesian.

The problem is made even more difficult by a long-standing official government policy of not permitting the ethnic origin of Indonesian nationals to be recorded in official documents. In spite of these difficulties, most native Indonesians claim that they are still able to distinguish the Chinese who have adopted Indonesian names and customs from the "native" population.

There are a multitude of terms which have been used over the years to distinguish between the "native Indonesians" (the most common terms are "pribumi" or "Indonesia asli") and Chinese Indonesians (who have been variously referred to as Chinese, overseas Chinese, cina, totok, peranakan, ethnic Chinese, local Chinese, foreign-born Chinese, Indonesian Chinese, alien Chinese, citizen Chinese, and so forth.)

For the purposes of this study, only four terms are important: pribumi, peranakan, totok, and cina. 'Pribumi' is an Indonesian term which literally means 'indigenous' or 'native.' During the colonial era, the vast majority of the population of the archipelago came to regard themselves collectively as indigenous, in contrast to the non-indigenous Dutch, Chinese, and Arab communities. This perception existed (and still exists today) in spite of the fact that the pribumi population consists of hundreds of different ethnic and linguistic groups. 'Peranakan' is the term used to refer to the Indonesia-born Chinese who use Malay or one of the other indigenous dialects as their medium of communication; culturally they are partly or wholly adapted to the pribumi community.(4) 'Totok' refers primarily to China-

(4) Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority, and China, (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1978), pp. 2-3.

born Chinese residing in Indonesia. Totoks still speak Mandarin or some other Chinese dialect as their primary means of communication. Their immediate descendants, although Indonesia-born, are still considered totoks if the mother tongue is still Chinese.(5) 'Cina' is a derogatory Indonesian term for China and Chinese. The present military government began using this term in 1966, to remove a feeling of inferiority on the part of pribumi Indonesians, while on the other hand removing the feeling of superiority on the part of the ethnic Chinese.(6) (In this study, the term 'ethnic Chinese' will be used when referring to both peranakan and totok. The term 'pribumi' will be used to refer to Indonesians of non-Chinese ancestry.)

Until the early twentieth century, peranakans dominated the ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia.(7) The volume of immigration was moderate, so that assimilation of immigrant Chinese into local peranakan society was rapid. This was particularly true in view of the fact that very few of the Chinese immigrants were women. The men tended to marry

(5) Ibid., pp. 2-3.

(6) Ibid., pp. 2-3.

(7) G. William Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," in Colloquium on Overseas Chinese, ed. Morton H. Fried (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), p. 2 ff.

Indonesian or peranakan women, thus increasing the pace of assimilation.(8)

However, beginning in the first decade of the twentieth century, the number of Chinese immigrants increased significantly. Additionally, the number of non-Hokkiens among the immigrants increased to the point that Hakkas and Cantonese vastly outnumbered the Hokkiens. These new immigrants were more reluctant to assimilate into a Hokkien-flavored peranakan way of life. Assimilation was also retarded by the rise of Chinese nationalism which increased as Sun Yat-sen and the Kuo Min-tang Party gained popularity.(9)

A system of Chinese-language schools and a Chinese-language press were developed after 1900, making it easier for the totok community to retain its Chinese identity. It has always been quite difficult for the pribumi Indonesians to perceive the distinctions between the various ethnic Chinese groups. This is, in part, a holdover from the colonial period, when all Chinese were lumped together as foreign orientals. The pribumi view is based on the conviction that the ethnic Chinese are immune to change: "Once

(8) G. William Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," in Indonesia, ed. Ruth T. McVey (New Haven: Yale Univ Press, 1967). p. 105.

(9) Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, The Chinese Minority, and China, (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1978), p. 3.

a Chinese, always a Chinese."(10) Chinese of whatever stripe, being clannish and ever faithful to their native land, have remained completely unchanged by however many years or generations they have spent in Indonesia. In the views of many Indonesians, peranakans differ from foreign Chinese only in that the peranakans found their self-interest to be best served by an opportunistic assumption of Indonesian citizenship. Pribumi business groups in competition with ethnic Chinese are eager to perpetuate the view that all Chinese are the same.(11)

(10) A. J. Muaja, The Chinese Problem in Indonesia, (Jakarta: New Nusantara, 1958), pp. 9-10.

(11) Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," p. 112.

PATTERNS OF CHINESE MIGRATION TO INDONESIA

The migration which gave rise to Chinese settlement in Indonesia had its origin in the early sixteenth century junk trade of Chinese merchants from southeastern China. Freed from the stultifying effects of the imperial bureaucracy, the overseas Chinese proved highly adept at economic development, but they retained their traditional industriousness, thrift, self-reliance, venturousness, and skill. These qualities marked the immigrants out for success in a land of rich resources whose indigenous peoples were not oriented to such industriousness.(12)

Chinese immigrants to Indonesia have come almost exclusively from the two Chinese provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung, which are unusual in China because of their great ethnic diversity. The three major language groups of these two provinces (Hokien, Hakka, and Cantonese) are mutually unintelligible, differing from one another at least as much as Italian from Spanish and Spanish from Portuguese.(13)

Hokkiens were the first Chinese to settle in Indonesia in large numbers, arriving in the seventeenth century. They

(12) G. William Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 102.

(13) Ibid., p. 105.

formed the dominant group among the immigrants until the mid-nineteenth century. Hokkien culture is very mercantilistic; ethnic Chinese of Hokkien ancestry are more often occupied in trade than those descended from other Chinese groups. Today, the Hokkiens and their descendants are the dominant Chinese group in East Indonesia, Central and East Java, and on the West coast of Sumatra.

A second group is the Teochius, whose language is similar to that of the Hokkiens. In Indonesia, the Teochius are found primarily outside Java, concentrated along Eastern Sumatra, in the Riau archipelago (located in the Sumatra Straits), and in West Borneo. Traditionally, they have specialized in agriculture, and were much prized by plantation managers as estate laborers. In the last sixty years, the Teochius have taken up the whole range of commercial trade; in many areas with few Hokkiens, the Teochius dominate trade.

Another major group are the Hakkas. Throughout the great migration waves from 1850 to 1930, the Hakkas were the poorest of the Chinese immigrants from the mainland. The Hakkas specialized in mining; they still dominate Chinese society in the former gold-mining districts of West Kalimantan. Late in the nineteenth century, Hakkas came to West Java in large numbers. Hakkas are now the largest Chinese group in Greater Jakarta and West Java, specializing in

shopkeeping and unskilled labor.

The last major group of Chinese immigrants are the Cantonese. This group began arriving in Indonesia about the same time as the Hakkas; however, they generally came with more capital, and also had an exceptional measure of mechanical and industrial skill. The Cantonese settled primarily in the cities, working as skilled artisans, machine workers, owners of hardware stores and small industries, as well as restaurants and hotels. The Cantonese are far less numerous than the other Chinese groups, and are evenly distributed throughout most urban areas in Indonesia.

After the fall of the Republic of South Vietnam to North Vietnamese forces, approximately 60,000 "boat people" (over half of whom were ethnic Chinese) had made their way to Indonesia by 1980. The Suharto government refused to allow any of them to settle in Indonesia. All of the refugees had to apply to other nations, such as the United States, for permanent homes.(14)

(14) Asia 1981 Yearbook, (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1981), pp. 151-152.

THE PERENNIAL PROBLEM

Although some scholars would disagree, (15) I believe the most explosive source of communal conflict in Indonesia has been the "perennial problem:" the cleavage that exists between "native" Indonesians and the ethnic Chinese. With only about three percent of a total Indonesian population of 160 million, the ethnic Chinese are very much a minority group. However, they exercise a critical influence on key sectors of the Indonesian economy which far outweighs their actual numbers. Similar problems exist throughout Southeast Asia. It has been estimated that there are a total of 15 to 18 million ethnic Chinese throughout the region, with more than half to be found in Malaysia (at least 36 per cent of a total population of 11 million) and Singapore (about 75 per cent of over two million people). (16)

Both the preeminent economic position of the Chinese and the resentment of the indigenous Indonesians toward them have their roots in the colonial legacy of the Dutch. Favoring a policy of "divide and rule," the Dutch created

(15) See Brackman, Indonesia: The Critical Years. The author lists five potentials for conflict: youth, regionalism, Islam, the communists, and the military. The ethnic Chinese are mentioned only briefly.

(16) Ian Buruma, "Call of the Motherland," Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong: 22 November 1984), p. 48.

three classes of people: first, the white ruling class; second, the commercial class of "foreign orientals" (predominantly Chinese, but also including Indians, Arabs, and others); and third, the indigenous peoples, who were cast in the lowliest, most subservient position.(17) Intent upon maintaining their power, the Dutch colonial authorities deliberately prevented assimilation between the foreign orientals and the native peoples. This encouraged the Chinese to continue to maintain their own cultural heritage and to develop notions of cultural superiority which caused them to look down upon the Indonesian natives.

Periodic anti-Chinese outbursts have been a feature of internal disturbances in Indonesia during the post-independence period. In fact, a concerted Indonesian campaign to dislodge Chinese traders from rural regions in 1959 led the PRC to repatriate more than 100,000 of her nationals from Indonesia.(18) However, during the period of Guided Democracy, Sukarno attached the highest priority to maintaining good relations with Peking, since he needed PRC support for his foreign policy initiatives. Therefore, Sukarno did

(17) Bunge, Indonesia: A Country Study, p. 13.

(18) Peter Polomka, Indonesia's Future and Southeast Asia, Adelphi Papers No. 104, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), p. 23.

everything in his power to contain anti-Chinese sentiment.

Underlying the quite widespread anti-Chinese sentiment is a very complex set of historical, political, economic, and cultural factors. The Chinese have been variously accused of having been "colonial lackeys"; of siding with the Dutch during the struggle for independence; of exploiting native Indonesians by monopolizing key sectors of the economy; of being unpatriotic in that their allegiance is to either Peking or Taipei rather than Jakarta; and of cultural arrogance and general attitudes of superiority. Other factors include China's size and importance in world affairs, and the industriousness of her people. All of these factors came to a head in the last months of 1965.

30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT

The most crucial event in recent Indonesian history was the coup attempted by the 30 September Movement in 1965. The event was important in terms of both the Indonesian government's policies toward the ethnic Chinese minority and its policies toward the People's Republic of China. In order to understand the importance of this event, it is necessary to describe the background, the abortive coup itself, and the events which occurred after the coup failed.

The first factor in the coup and its aftermath was President Sukarno. From the day in August 1945 when Sukarno read a declaration of independence from the Dutch to a small group outside his home in Jakarta, until March 1966, when he authorized General Suharto to act in his behalf, Bung Karno (as he was known to his people) occupied the center stage of Indonesian politics.

Sukarno was the only candidate considered for the office of the president of the Revolutionary Republic of Indonesia established by the nationalists after the Japanese surrender in 1945. After the Dutch were finally persuaded to leave, he was unanimously elected president-for-life of the Federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia. Then, in August 1950, he became president-for-life of the Republic of Indonesia, which was established after the states of the Federal Republic had merged into a unitary state.

Throughout his presidency, Sukarno had more than presidential powers. He carried with him sacred emblems that had been symbols of royalty and magic power since the third and fourth centuries A.D.(19) He always traveled like royalty, with a retinue of at least fifty high-ranking government officials, both inside and outside Indonesia. Gradually, he assumed a mystic, almost god-like aura as the symbol of Indonesian unity. He acquired a great number of titles from both the parliament and the people; among them the "Mandate of the People's Tongue" and the "Great Leader of the Revolution." (20) These titles were used by Sukarno to maintain and expand his personal, extraconstitutional power. As he became more and more dissatisfied with the political structure which had been established in Indonesia, he tended more and more to bypass his subordinates in the government, speaking directly to the peoples of Indonesia. By 1959, Sukarno had managed to dismantle most of the parliamentary system, replacing it with something he called "Guided Democracy," which was little more than a personal dictatorship with democratic trappings.

(19) Peter Polomka, Indonesia Since Sukarno (Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 85.

(20) Wilfred T. Neill, Twentieth Century Indonesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 350.

Sukarno had a dynamic, imposing, extremely charismatic personality. He had no peers among his countrymen as a skilled orator and political performer. Organizationally, however, he was much less gifted, and he did a very poor job of governing Indonesia. He did not try to conceal the fact that administration of policy, particularly economic policy, bored him. Under Sukarno, the Indonesian economy was a shambles, a joke. He did not believe in budgets or planning; everything depended solely on Sukarno's personal whims. He poured billions of dollars of borrowed money into massively equipped armed forces and grandiose, but virtually useless prestige projects. Many of the magnificent edifices constructed during the Sukarno era were surrounded by some of the most abject poverty in Asia. In spite of these deficiencies, Sukarno was, for over twenty years, the living symbol of Indonesia, a force which had to be taken into account in any political undertaking.

The second factor in the coup was the Indonesian army. Sukarno had risen to power with the aid of the military; the dawning of Guided Democracy found him sharing power mainly with the army. The strength of the armed forces stemmed from a virtual monopoly of physical force. The army had gained great prestige in the wars of liberation from the Dutch; it had gained great influence from the imposition of martial

law in 1957, and from the decisive and effective manner in which it had acted against the frequent regional rebellions throughout the archipelago.

The position, influence and prestige of the military in Indonesia is well-illustrated by the following anecdote. The scene is a very, very crowded bus in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta. One man addresses another in a very, very polite voice. "Excuse me, sir. Are you a member of the military?" "No, I'm not," came the reply. "Is your son in the military?" "No." "Is your brother, uncle, or nephew in the military?" Again, the response is "no." The first man then becomes very angry, shouting and cursing: "Then get the @#\$% off my feet, you slimy @#\$% !" (or words to that effect.)(21)

Sukarno was able to institute his program of Guided Democracy primarily through reliance on the military. His problem then became one of preventing the military from shoving him aside. A complex, ambivalent relationship took shape between Sukarno and the military. Although Sukarno agreed with the military goal of curbing the power and influence of the political parties (after all, Guided Democracy would not have been possible without such a move), he began hedging against the possibility of becoming himself

(21) Polomka Indonesia Since Sukarno, p. 79.

a captive of military power. Sukarno accomplished this by playing various factions within the armed forces against each other, but more importantly, by using the Indonesian Communist Party as a counterweight to the military.(22)

Thus, the last factor in the coup is the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Increasingly, competition for power in the period of Guided Democracy centered around a triangle of Sukarno, the military, and the Indonesian Communist Party. In this situation, faced with an implacably hostile army, the PKI sought to establish a secure alliance with Sukarno.

As was the case in Malaysia in the mid 1950's, there was a perception that the Indonesian Communist Party was predominantly a Chinese organization, receiving extensive direction and support from the People's Republic of China. This was particularly the perception of the military leadership.

The alarm the military felt toward the Indonesian Communist Party was not eased by the actions of President Sukarno. In the period from 1963 to 1965, Sukarno moved more and more to the left in his international relations. He became friends with Castro, relied upon the Soviet Union

(22)Frederika M. Bunge, et al. Indonesia: A Country Study, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 54.

as the sole source of military equipment and weapons in his massive buildup of the armed forces (particularly the air force), and developed an ever closer relationship with the People's Republic of China. Many Indonesians began to speak of a "Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi-Jakarta Axis." (23)

During this period, the PKI's stature and its influence over Sukarno steadily increased. This made many army officers very nervous, particularly as they came to feel that Sukarno's "Crush Malaysia" campaign and the withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations would result in the isolation of the country from the rest of the non-communist world. (24) Domestically, Sukarno began advocating a policy of NASAKOM (an acronym for the Indonesian words for "nationalism, religion, and communism"). This ever leftward trend sharpened tensions between the army and the PKI.

A growing number of Indonesians, both military and non-military, began to suspect that some kind of secret alliance existed between Sukarno and the PKI. By 1965, this suspicion seemed to be confirmed when the communists, now part of all the major councils of state, pushed for the establishment of a fifth armed force (in addition to the army, navy, air

(23) Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesia: The Gestapu Affair, (New York: Asian-American Educational Exchange, 1969) p. 25.

(24) Harold A. Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ Press, 1978), p. 28.

force, and national police) composed of armed workers and peasants organized into "self defense" units.(25) Sukarno supported this move, and at the same time, attempted to pressure the military into accepting political advisors of Sukarno's choosing at the unit level.(26)

Things finally came to a head on the night of 30 September - 01 October 1965. As much as is possible, considering the fog of distortions and propaganda that has surrounded the coup attempted by the 30 September Movement, the following details can be discerned.

The original timetable established by the Indonesian Communists called for the PKI to assume power peacefully in 1970.(27) This goal certainly seemed attainable in view of the active support given them by Sukarno and the ever increasing tendency of Indonesian foreign policy to favor Communist China. One crucial factor (the apparently failing health of the aging President Sukarno) may have caused the Indonesian Communist Party to step up this timetable, resorting to a coup d'etat to achieve power. The army dis-

(25)Asia 1966 Yearbook, (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1966), p. 183.

(26)Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p.121.

(27)Neill, Twentieth Century Indonesia, p. 350.

trusted the communists; the communists distrusted the army. With the third leg of the tripod in uncertain health, it is certain that both groups had contingency plans for moving against each other in the event of Sukarno's death. The Indonesian Communist Party in particular feared that a "Council of Generals" was plotting against the President. It is therefore not surprising that it was the PKI, and not the army, that attempted a coup d'etat.

The headquarters for the 30 September Movement was Halim air base, just south of Jakarta. This base also served as the headquarters for the Indonesian air force; it was at this base that the presidential jet was maintained. On the evening of 30 September 1965, three military officers with strong communist sympathies met at Halim air base. One, LtCol Untung, was an army officer of great personal courage and apparent loyalty, who was at that time serving as the commander of the honor battalion which formed the elite personal guard of President Sukarno. Another was Brigadier General Supardjo, an army officer who had been exiled to Kalimantan to take part in the campaign to crush Malaysia, due to overt pro-communist sympathies and activities. The third was General Dhani, commander of the Indonesian air force, who was allegedly supposed to replace Sukarno as president after the coup. (Several months before this meeting, General Dhani had agreed to the use of Halim air base

as a covert training site for a force of communist shock troops which was to be the nucleus of a peasant militia which Sukarno had apparently agreed to.) (28)

Troops at the disposal of the 30 September Movement had been divided into three groups: the first was to seize the army's top generals; the second, consisting of two paratroop battalions, was to surround the presidential palace and occupy the near-by radio station and telecommunications facility; the third constituted a reserve force, consisting primarily of newly trained communist militiamen, to be held in readiness at Halim.(29)

The most crucial assignment was the capture, dead or alive, of seven army generals. (An eighth intended victim was a member of the Indonesian delegation to a national celebration in Communist China.) Three of the generals were captured in their homes; three were killed in front of their families; and the seventh, General Nasution, the minister of defense, managed to escape, suffering only a broken ankle. However, Nasution's five-year-old daughter was mortally wounded by the raiders.

The six generals who had been captured (three dead and three alive) were taken to Halim air base. All six were

(28)Jack Woddis, "The Indonesian Coup," in Armies and Politics, (New York: International Pub., 1978), p. 283.

(29)Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 83.

beaten with rifle butts, hacked at with knives, and riddled with bullets. The six mutilated bodies were then thrown down a well, which was filled in and covered over to avoid discovery. When the bodies were discovered the following week, grisly stories about the extent of their mutilation were widely published throughout Indonesia. The rumors stated that the bodies had been dismembered, with eyes and ears slashed away and sexual organs removed. Such gory details assumed great political importance in the ensuing weeks and months.

For most Indonesians, the first news of these events came through a 7:15 a.m. radio broadcast from the station which had been occupied by the second coup group. The broadcast stated that the "30 September Movement" had acted against a "Council of Generals," a subversive group sponsored by the American Central Intelligence Agency. As leader of the Movement, LtCol Untung had acted to protect the President from the generals who were planning a counterrevolutionary coup.(30) The Movement declared that Sukarno was safe under its protection.

In fact, Sukarno had actually been at the home of one of his wives when he received the first reports of the coup.

(30)Stephen Sloan, A Study in Political Violence: The Indonesian Experience, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), p. 25.

The president decided to go to Halim air base, where the presidential jet was maintained.(31) After conferring with General Dhani, the air force commander, Sukarno set up headquarters in the house of a senior air force officer who lived on the base. (These decisions later provided Sukarno's critics with their most useful ammunition.)

The plotters had made two serious blunders which were to prove catastrophic for them. The first was allowing the escape of General Nasution. The second was that they had failed to include General Suharto, the commander of the army's strategic reserve, on their hit list. Suharto, joined by Nasution, acted at once to bring the situation under control. Their first move was to confine all military forces to quarters until friend could be separated from foe. The navy and the police agreed to grant Suharto the authority to coordinate all moves by the various armed services. For obvious reasons, he did not receive the cooperation of General Dhani or the air force.

By 6:10 a.m. on 02 October 1965, Suharto had taken the coup headquarters without a single casualty to his men. In the capital city at least, the coup had been smashed little more than twenty-four hours after it had begun.

There now occurred one of the more inexplicable developments in the entire affair. Although the 30 September Move-

(31) Asia 1967 Yearbook, p. 213.

had clearly been smashed in Jakarta, the official Indonesian Communist Party newspaper printed an editorial supporting the Movement; this edition went on sale in Jakarta early on 02 October 1965. It was an act of incredible political stupidity which sealed the fate of the PKI. Suharto declared a state of martial law and banned the paper.(32) Two days later, the bodies of the slain generals were recovered from the well. In spite of the resulting demands that the Communist Party be banned, President Sukarno refused. In fact, Sukarno made the error of not attending the funeral of the dead generals, held on 05 October.

During the coup, the communists had also tried to take control of cities other than Jakarta. In some areas, the communists held out for more than a week. In parts of Sumatra, they held out for almost a month. In the aftermath of the coup, General Suharto and his colleagues attempted to launch a decisive assault on the PKI through an appeal to emotionalism, particularly after the discovery of the bodies of the slain generals. However, they found it necessary to follow an indirect path toward the goal of destroying the communists.

In spite of his slightly tarnished image from some unanswered questions about his possible connection to the coup-

(32)Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia After Sukarno, (Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1971), p. 125.

makers, Sukarno remained the living symbol of Indonesia. To the chagrin of the army (and particularly Nasution and Suharto), Sukarno steadfastly refused to acknowledge the participation of the PKI in the coup. General Suharto knew that Sukarno still maintained a special place in the hearts of most Indonesians. Direct condemnation of the NASAKOM policy (which Sukarno still preached) would be viewed as a direct, personal attack on the "Great Leader of the Revolution." (33) At this point, the army wished to avoid even the appearance of conflict or disagreement with Bung Karno; his personal prestige was still too great. However, while the army did not initially call openly for the banning of the Indonesian Communist Party, they did begin a covert, systematic attempt to destroy the PKI, using various civilian anti-communist political factions. (34)

As the army attempted to mobilize anti-PKI forces by playing upon public emotions, the character of the reaction to the coup increased in intensity and spread throughout the entire archipelago. The carnage that took place has been described as an anti-communist campaign. However, the attack on the communists was actually a pretext which allowed the peasantry to vent the frustrations born of a wide variety of issues. As the Iranians recently used anti-Western

(33) Sloan, A Study in Political Violence, p. 66.

(34) _____, Ibid., p.82.

fervor, the Islamic fundamentalists throughout Indonesia used the anti-communist drive as a means of reasserting traditional beliefs in the face of the forces of modernization. A call for Djihad, or Holy War, was issued against the communists. The PKI was labeled as "Anti-religious", "Anti-God", and as the "Devil of the Country and the City." The Ulama's accused the PKI of being backed by the CIA -- but in this case, the letters stood for the Chinese Intelligence Agency of the People's Republic of China.(35)

The real enemy was not actually the Indonesian Communist Party, but what it stood for - the forces of modernization in the form of ideology. To the average villager, the anti-communist campaign was not a campaign against a political party or movement, but primarily a reaction against those forces which threatened traditional values, and the PKI was a symbol of those forces.

The ethnic Chinese, both *peranakan* and *totok*, were a primary target of the mass reaction against the communists. Because of their cultural exclusiveness and arrogance, and their economic control of small and medium level commerce, the ethnic Chinese were constantly subject to the suspicion and jealousy of the native Indonesians. The events surround-

(35)Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 308.

ing the 30 September Movement and the actions of the Indonesian communists were used primarily as a justification for ethnic animosity. Old scores were settled under the rationalization of political expediency.

Thus, when the military appealed to public emotions in their campaign to destroy the communists, an atmosphere was created in which violence ultimately represented the release of frustrations that were much more than anti-communist. The PKI was a symbol of change, and became the victim of a violent reaction to this change.(36) During November and December 1965, it is estimated that from 150,000 to 750,000 communists, Chinese, and other unpopular types were shot, stabbed, beaten, or hacked to death as people went on a rampage of violence. Whole villages were wiped out by night raiders, old scores were settled, feuds and vendettas were concluded.(37) At least 350,000 more communists and suspected communists were arrested. Most of these were released by 1975, but over 30,000 were held until 1980.(38)

Even in the face of this truly massive anti-communist

(36)Sloan, A Study in Political Violence, p. 73.

(37)Neill, Twentieth Century Indonesia, p. 356.

(38)See George Thomas Kurian, Encyclopedia of the Third World (Revised Edition), Vol II Guyana to Qatar, (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1983), p. 818. See also Asia 1981 Yearbook, p. 151; and James Bartholomew, "The Torture Catalog," Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong: 3 May 1984), p. 28.

reaction, Sukarno refused to admit a past error of judgment, announcing an intention to rebuild the PKI and to continue to pursue the goals of "nationalism, religion, and communism" embodied in NASAKOM. For the first time in over two decades, Bung Karno failed to speak for the Indonesian people. Sukarno's intransigence both forced and permitted Suharto to apply increased pressure on the President. This eventually resulted in the so-called "Disguised Coup" of 11 March 1966 in which Suharto forced Sukarno to sign an order granting Suharto "full authority to take all measures necessary to safeguard the people and the government." (39)

The army maintains to this day that it did not actually carry out a coup against Sukarno, claiming that the President "voluntarily" handed over wide powers to Suharto. General Suharto, of course, had absolutely "nothing to do" with the armed group of men who presented the document to Sukarno for signature, and he also had no connection with the hundreds of "undisciplined troops" who just happened to be outside the presidential palace at the same time! (40)

One of Suharto's first actions was an official ban on the Indonesian Communist Party. Over the course of the next week, thousands of army troops supported by tanks were stationed in the streets of Jakarta. Dozens of Sukarno's

(39) Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 189.

(40) Asia 1967 Yearbook, p. 214.

supporters in the government were arrested. Sukarno retained the presidency, but no longer for life; Suharto would be acting for him when he was ill or out of the capital. By March 1967, it became obvious to everyone that Sukarno was under house arrest. Suharto continued to hold only the post of acting president until March 1968, when he was formally appointed president by the highest constitutional authority in the country; he still holds that office today. Bung Karno remained under house arrest until his death in June 1970.

NEW ORDER POLICIES TOWARD THE ETHNIC CHINESE MINORITY

As soon as General Suharto had wrested effective control of the government from President Sukarno, both domestic and foreign policies were changed immediately, and radically, moving from Guided Democracy to a "New Order."

Immediately after the 1965 coup, most Indonesians held the overseas Chinese responsible for the alleged role of the PRC in the abortive coup. Anti-Chinese feelings ran high and the Chinese had a difficult time. Regional authorities took independent action against the local Chinese in their areas.

At this point, it is important to examine Suharto's attitude toward the Chinese minority, since he has now been in firm control of the Indonesian government for almost twenty years, and it is Suharto's views which are largely reflected in official policies. Like many army generals, Suharto considers the Chinese minority as an alien group. His intention has always been to assimilate this minority into the indigenous population. In 1966, he issued a decree requiring all Indonesian citizens of Chinese ancestry to adopt Indonesian names, thereby hoping to speed up the assimilation process.(41) It is Suharto's view that citizens of Chinese extraction enjoy the same rights and privileges and

(41) Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians..., pp. 41-42.

have the same obligations as other (indigenous) citizens. He disapproves of any discriminatory practices against the ethnic Chinese, but feels that their exclusive social life must be eradicated in order to minimize their differences from other Indonesian groups.

In 1968, while talking to a Japanese audience, Suharto stated that the Chinese in Indonesia dominated at least 70 per cent of the Indonesian economy.(42) He urged Chinese businessmen to take pribumi Indonesians as partners in their economic ventures. Starting in 1973, Suharto (bowing to pressure from non-Chinese businessmen) began to emphasize the distinction between 'pribumi' and 'cina' Indonesians in connection with government financial assistance and joint ventures. He denied that this was drawing distinctions along racial lines, but was merely designed to help an economically disadvantaged group.(43) He continued to urge the incorporation (44) of the local Chinese into the pribumi

(42) Asia 1969 Yearbook, p. 195

(43) Derek Davies, "Indonesia: Looking to Its Own," Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 March 1974, p. 50.

(44) Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Identity," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: 1975), pp. 115-116. Horowitz identifies two kinds of assimilation: one is 'amalgamation' defined as "two or more groups united to form a new, larger group"; the other is 'incorporation' defined as "one group assumes the identity of another" The goal of New Order policies is incorporation of the Chinese into the Pribumi majority, rather than amalgamation or integration (which would maintain a separate peranakan identity.)

population, calling it not only desirable, but absolutely essential. (45)

Under the New Order, separate ethnic Chinese organizations have either been discouraged or banned outright.(46) If peranakan Chinese desire to participate in politics, they can join only the existing pribumi parties. The separate Chinese-language schools that had existed since the beginning of the twentieth century were also banned. Only those schools which employed the official baha Indonesia language were permitted.(47)

The basic problem was in differences of perception. Pribumi Indonesians (both the leaders and the general populace) tend to view the local Chinese as a monolithic group which resisted assimilation, was a "Trojan Horse" loyal to an inimical foreign power, and was extremely powerful economically.(48) The ethnic Chinese, on the other hand, viewed them-

(45) Davies, "Indonesia: Looking to Its Own," p. 50.

(46) Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians..., p. 14.

(47) Asia 1968 Yearbook, p. 198.

(48) Polomka (Indonesia After Sukarno, p. 45) points out that, in the eyes of the average pribumi, the 'cina' were much more likely to live in a brick house, own a car, have a better education, live in the city, and so forth, than were pribumis.

selves as a trading minority, primarily composed of middle class elements, extremely diversified in their cultural and political orientations, but basically oriented toward the Indonesian nation.(49) These differences in perceptions have long been a source of conflict in Indonesia.

This resentment of the economic advantages of the local Chinese has intensified with the emergence of a phenomenon known as "cukongism". 'Cukong' is a Chinese (Hokkien) term meaning 'master.' But in Indonesia, it is used to denote a "skillful Chinese businessman who closely cooperates as a middleman with those in power, especially the military." (50) In order to improve the incredibly poor economic situation inherited from the Sukarno government, (inflation was averaging 650 per cent, and a significantly large portion of the population was in danger of starvation) a number of government officials approached wealthy *peranakan* and *totok* businessmen, offering protection and exemption from certain governmental financial restrictions in return for needed capital. Roeder also stated that the *cukongs* had a steady and inside track to government contracts, investment credits, and other funds.

(49) Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians..., p. 77.

(50) O. G. Roeder, "Chinese Impudence," Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 May 1973, p. 34.

The business environment in Indonesia, coupled with discriminatory laws and practices against the Chinese, led these Chinese to regard collaboration with pribumi power holders as a surer way to achieve safe and secure profits.(51) The pribumi powerholders seem to prefer using Chinese (rather than other pribumi) businessmen, because the pribumi tend to have stronger bargaining power and to be associated with political groups. The Chinese are politically safer, precisely because they tend to be politically weak and vulnerable. This close collaboration between pribumi officials and Chinese businessmen has created a great deal of resentment, particularly among the less successful pribumi business interests.

Numerous attempts had been made, even under Sukarno's Guided Democracy, to assimilate the ethnic Chinese into the pribumi population. One serious issue was the problem of "dual citizenship." Prior to the Dual Nationality Treaty (which was ratified in early 1960), all Indonesian citizens of Chinese ancestry were also considered to be citizens of the Peoples Republic of China. Under the provisions of the Treaty, every person of Chinese ancestry in Indonesia had to officially reject Chinese citizenship prior to 20 January 1962; otherwise, they would automatically lose their Indonesian citizenship.

(51) Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians..., p. 142.

There is no information available regarding the actual number of dual nationals who chose Indonesian citizenship. Skinner estimated that about 600,000 to 800,000 Indonesian-born Chinese opted for Indonesian citizenship.(52) This meant that over one-and-a-half million Chinese in Indonesia retained non-Indonesian citizenship. These alien Chinese were further divided into PRC citizens and 'stateless' Chinese.(53)

In April 1969, the New Order parliament decided to renounce the Dual Nationality Treaty, due to the hostile relations that existed between the Indonesia and PRC governments. The abrogation of the Treaty made it much more difficult (and expensive) for alien Chinese to become Indonesian citizens.(54)

In early 1981, Suharto reversed this policy of making it difficult for alien Chinese to acquire Indonesian citizenship. He signed two related citizenship decrees which were

(52) Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," p. 112.

(53) Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, p. 122. Since Indonesia did not officially recognize Taiwan, those ethnic Chinese who identified themselves with Taiwan had no citizenship; they formed a minority among the Chinese in Indonesia.

(54) Hugh Mabbett, et al. The Chinese in Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia, (London: Minority Rights Group, Report No. 10, 1972), p. 11.

expected to allow for the mass naturalization of almost two million ethnic Chinese.(55) (Unfortunately, I have no information on how many alien Chinese have chosen to do so.)

Although the New Order considers the Chinese problem to be one of the most seriously divisive elements in the country, the actions taken by the Suharto government have not always been directed specifically against the Chinese. The official government ideology of "Pancasila," (with its five pillars of God, humanity, nationalism, democracy, and social justice) has also caused the government to crack down on political parties and Muslim separatists, as well as the Chinese.

Since 1965, there have been periodic outbreaks of pribumi violence against the Chinese. For example, the January 1974 visit of the Japanese prime minister led to riots ostensibly protesting Japanese exploitation of the Indonesian economy. However, the principal target of the rioters were the ethnic Chinese.(56) Since then, smaller riots, lead by high school and university students, have occurred periodically. The Muslims have rioted against perceived Chinese immorality, protesting such Chinese-owned businesses as gambling halls, nightclubs, and massage parlors.(57) In late 1980, large-

(55) Asia 1981 Yearbook, pp. 151-152.

(56) Bunge, Indonesia: A Country Study, p. 57.

(57) Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion, pp. 203-206.

scale anti-Chinese riots broke out in Central Java on a minor pretext, resulting in eight deaths, with damage to some 240 Chinese shops and 230 homes, in addition to Chinese factories, office buildings, and several schools.(58) At least 20 people were killed in anti-Chinese riots in September 1984, in an incident in which Muslims were protesting both secular government and the "Godless Chinese."(59) In the next month, three bombs were detonated at branches of Bank Central Asia, the largest Chinese-owned bank in Indonesia.(60)

Unfortunately for Indonesia, the anti-Chinese violence will probably come again in the future.

(58) Asia 1981 Yearbook, p. 153.

(59) Kieran Cooke, "Jakarta Riot Reveals Political Strains...", The Christian Science Monitor, 17 September 1984, p. 13.

(60) Susumu Awanohara, "Bombs in Chinatown," Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 October 1984, pp. 18-19.

INDONESIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Early in his rule, General Suharto emphatically rejected the leftward direction and ideological base of Sukarno's foreign policy, reviving the original nonaligned foreign policy of the Republic's first decade. In 1966, Indonesia rejoined the United Nations; in the following years, it reestablished close relations with those nations antagonized by Sukarno's hostile postures: the United States, Malaysia, India, Australia, the Netherlands, other Western European countries, and Japan. The United States replaced the Soviet Union and Communist China as the principle supplier of military hardware and economic aid.

The extremely close relations that had existed with China since 1964 were severely strained by mass attacks organized by anti-Sukarno and anti-PKI forces on the PRC embassy in Jakarta and the consulate in Medan (in Northern Sumatra), as well as against the ethnic Chinese in general. The Peking government was explicitly accused of aiding and abetting the PKI and the abortive coup, particularly in view of the fact that the surviving leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party had sought and received asylum in Peking. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were suspended in 1967.

Political reconciliation between the two countries has been a difficult issue, primarily because of the lingering

anti-Chinese sentiments found not only among the devout Muslims, but also among senior military and security officials, and because of the periodic outbreaks of anti-Chinese violence described in the previous section. (See pages 40-41, supra.) The Indonesian government is concerned, not only about the possibility of subversion through the outlawed PKI, but also about the Chinese guerrilla forces which have operated along the border between Sarawak (Eastern Malaysia) and West Kalimantan. Since 1967, Indonesian military forces have cooperated with Malaysian forces in trying to eliminate these forces.(61) The Suharto government is also apprehensive about the emergence of an expansionist China armed with a nuclear arsenal. The former Indonesian foreign minister, Adam Malik, stated that China could be expected to expand in the direction of Southeast Asia, rather than Soviet Asia or the Indian subcontinent.(62)

After the failure of the Cultural Revolution, the People's Republic of China (PRC) embarked on a campaign of encouraging relations with a number of non-communist nations throughout the world. This campaign is best exemplified by the Sino-American ping-pong matches in the early 1970's.

(61) Peter Polomka, Indonesia's Future and Southeast Asia, p. 24.

(62) Adam Malik, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3, April 1973, pp. 103-105.

Indonesia was perhaps the only country to refuse Peking's "ping-pong" diplomacy, resisting both domestic and international pressures to resume relations broken off in the wake of the abortive 30 September Movement coup. As long as the New Order government is in power in Indonesia, it is unlikely that normal relations with China will be resumed.

The "China issue" has also affected Indonesian relations with other nations in Southeast Asia. The state of Singapore, with an ethnic Chinese majority of over 75 per-cent of the total population, has been a specific target of Indonesian resentment. This is due to Singapore's comparative economic advantage and affluence, derived primarily from the control that Singapore-based Chinese entrepreneurs, in association with Chinese living in Indonesia, exert over the economies of most Southeast Asian states, particularly that of Indonesia.(63)

China has also been an issue within ASEAN.(64) Thailand and Malaysia view Vietnam as the principal security threat to the region, particularly in view of its control of Laos

(63)Polomka, Indonesia's Future and Southeast Asia,p. 9.

(64) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In 1967,Indonesia was a founding member, along with Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines.

and most of Kampuchea. While Suharto disapproves of Vietnamese aggression, he tends to view Hanoi's role in Indochina as a "nationalist bulwark against the extension of Chinese power and influence." (65) China's so-called punitive expedition across its border with Vietnam in 1979 merely confirmed this view.

(65) Michael Leifer, "Indonesia," in Asia and Pacific Annual Review, (Essex, England: World of Information, 1979), p. 158.


CONCLUSIONS

The overseas Chinese are a fact of life in Southeast Asia. They have been so in Indonesia for over three centuries.

The problem for Indonesia is two-fold. First, is the matter of identification. The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia do not see themselves as a single, monolithic group. They have not only emigrated from differing areas of mainland China, but they have also emigrated at varying times. Both factors tend to create an extremely heterogeneous group of people. This heterogeneity is further complicated by the fact that various elements of the Chinese minority have been integrated into the pribumi majority to widely varying degrees. Therefore, many of the 'cina' who are less than one quarter Chinese by ancestry, speak no Chinese, have Indonesian names, wear Indonesian clothing, eat only Indonesian foods, follow Indonesian customs and traditions, and actually consider themselves to be Indonesian, are still viewed by pribumis as Chinese. As long as these perceptions exist, the anti-Chinese violence within Indonesia will continue, and the perennial problem will continue to be a problem.

Second, are the problems relating to international relations. The New Order government's paranoia toward China and the Chinese will continue to affect (often adversely) relations with Malaysia, Singapore, and the People's Republic of China. As long as the Suharto regime is in power, it is extremely doubtful that relations with the PRC will ever be normalized.

The "perennial problem" has indeed been one of the most significant factors in making Indonesia what it is today.



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